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Abstract. The operational perspective here defended permits a reflexive-transcendental point of view 
that  sharply  distinguishes  the  two  concepts,  while,  at  the  same  time,  maintaining  the  connection 
between them. On the one hand, simply imagining that the experimental apparatus,  counterfactually 
anticipated in a thought experiment, has really been constructed is sufficient to erase any difference 
between thought and real experiments. On the other hand, this very ‘imagining’, this capacity of the 
mind to assume every real entity as a possible entity, underpins the difference in principle – a properly 
transcendental difference – between thought and real experiments. This difference, however, implies the 
intimate  association between experiment  and  thought  experiment:  All  thought  experiments  must  be 
thought of as translatable into real ones, and all real experiments as realisations of thought ones. What 
thought experiments have over and above real experiments is the mere fact that they exist in a purely 
hypothetical  sphere;  what real  have over and above thought  experiments is  the mere fact  that  they 
overstep the sphere of the possible, in the experiment’s real execution.
It was noted some time ago by James Brown that a Kantian point of view is lacking in 
the critical literature on thought experiments (cf. Brown 1991a, p. 156). We now know 
that this, taken literally, is false. Contrary to what was commonly believed until a few 
decades ago, it was not Mach who introduced the term ‘thought experiment’, but Hans 
Christian  Örsted;  and  he  did  so  with  the  purpose  of  clarifying  an  aspect  of 
mathematics  and  its  relation  to  physical  knowledge  in  Kant.  However,  this 
interpretation of the nature of thought experiments and of their relation with real ones 
has  had virtually  no impact  on the historical  development  of  the  concept.  This  is 
largely  because  philosophy  of  science  has  mostly  taken  a  course  that  led  to  the 
rejection or dissolution of the Kantian  a priori, either in the empiricist  direction of 
Mach, of Neopositivism and of Popper, or in the conventionalist direction of French 
philosophy,  of  the  relativistic  philosophy  of  science  of  the  1960s  and  of  the 
‘sociological turn’ (that construed the a priori as changeable in function of historically 
shifting pragmatic interests). It is certainly possible – even though isolated similarities 
do not quite prove it – that Mach  took the term ‘Gedankenexperiment’ from Örsted 
(cf.  Kühne  2005,  pp.  186-187).  In  any  case,  it  is  important  to  keep  in  mind  the 
differences in principle between their conceptions of thought experiment, in particular 
as to the acceptance or rejection of the transcendental nature of the a priori. For this 
reason, the claim that a Kantian point of view is lacking in the critical literature on 
thought experiments was and is fundamentally correct in its spirit; and it has been my 
intention to fill this gap.
Here, briefly presented, is an account of real and thought experiments in the natural 
sciences,  as  it  examines  their  distinction  and  connection  in  principle  within  an 
operational perspective which brings together the empirical or formal point of view of 
naturalised  epistemologies  and  the  reflexive-transcendental  point  of  view  of  the 
Kantian  tradition.   The  account  is,  in  short,  at  once  reflexive-transcendental  and 
operational. 
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Fundamental agreement exists1 as to the essence of the basic problem faced by any 
investigation into the epistemological status of thought experiments: How can thought 
experiments,  which,  unlike  real  ones,  do  not  rely  on  new  material  drawn  from 
experience,  lead to unexpected conclusions sometimes capable of casting doubt on 
well-confirmed empirical theories?
From a methodological point of view, this explanation presupposes that the relation 
between thought experiments and real experiments be explained. The latter is possible 
only if both terms are explicitly and rightly understood. What real experiments are and 
how they function can not be taken for granted. As will be seen, the two concepts are 
closely connected,  to such a point that it  is impossible to overlook this connection 
without distorting the nature of both concepts.
1. Experiment and Theory: The Dialectic of Question and Answer
The technical, or practical operationalist perspective of the present investigation takes 
as its basic assumption and methodical starting point concrete human beings pursuing 
specific goals within shifting horizons of meaning. Through their bodies, such agents 
find themselves always and already in operational or technical interaction with the 
surrounding world.  Access  to  the  real  aspects  of  the  natural  world is  never  given 
passively. Rather, it is made possible by the connection between, on the one hand, our 
doing  (the  experimental  practices  that  constitute  our  operational  relation  with  the 
world)  and,  on  the  other  hand,  our  theoretical  awareness  of  that  doing.  To  use 
Wittgenstein’s famous image, here is where ‘[we] have reached bedrock, and [our] 
spade is upturned’.2
When we say that we take concrete human beings as our methodical starting point, this 
does not mean that we take as primary their interaction with reality with no further 
qualifications. Strictly speaking, the fact that access to the real aspects of the natural 
world  is  never  a  given  means  that  what  is  primary  is  not  merely  the  physical 
(mechanical,  chemical,  biological)  interaction  between  people  and the  surrounding 
world, but also human beings’ capacity to conceptualise and evaluate this interaction, 
since  only  both  components  together make  it  possible  to  consider  reality  from a 
partial, i.e. theoretical point of view.
In the thesis of theory ladenness there is both an important element of truth and a 
fundamental prejudice. 
Here is the element of truth: for an observation or an experimental result to have an 
intelligible  meaning,  it  must  be  the answer to  more  or  less  explicit  questions,  the 
formulation of which depends on determinate concepts and hypotheses. Human beings 
live,  already  and  always,  in  a  dialectic  of  question  and  answer.  This  theoretical-
dialogical (or problematic-dialogical) aspect is not limited to scientific knowledge but 
it concerns all human reasoning, be it scientific, philosophical or ethical. All reasoning 
involves a dialectic of a non-Hegelian type, but close to the personalistic tradition, 
characterised by the dialogues which the mind carries on with itself while at the same 
time referring to a superior authority as the benchmark for the truth or falsity of its 
judgements.  Scientific  experiments  must  be  understood  as  a  specific,  technical-
operational aspect of this general dialectic of question and answer. In short, on Kant’s 
suggestion, experimentation is a ‘question put to nature’ (Frage an die Natur), in a 
1 With only one exception of which I am aware (cf. Reiss 2002: 19).
2 Wittgenstein 1953: § 217, p. 85.
2
way that enables the researcher to investigate and grasp natural processes, not as a 
pupil  listening  passively but  as  a  judge who compels  the witnesses  to  answer his 
questions.3 
However, only the  meaning but not the determinate  truth (or falsity) of the theories 
applied to the real world can be legitimately presupposed. If there were a path leading 
from the experimental question not only to a certain type or genus of answer but also 
to  an experimental  answer that  is  specific  or  determinate  in  its  contents,  then the 
answer would already be implicit in the formulation of the question. In other words, if 
the theoretical presuppositions of a a question determined the answer right down to its 
particular  determinacy,  then  nothing  really  new,  which  was  not  contained  (albeit 
implicitly) in the question, could emerge from the answer. The subject determines the 
genus or  type of  the  operations  to  be  performed;  but  the  determinate  interaction 
between our instruments (and, more fundamentally, the organic body) and reality has 
qualities of its own, independent of the goals or values that led to the choice of the 
operations. 
From this standpoint, the limits and strengths of both new experimentalism and the 
relativistic  turn regarding scientific  experimentation  can readily be understood.  By 
striving to  prevent  experiments’  being swallowed up by the theoretical  aspect,  the 
leading exponents of the new experimentalism have seen experimental  practices as 
independent of linguistic-theoretical practices: unlike theories, experimentation ‘has a 
life of its own’.4 
Making such a claim, Hacking ended up endorsing the same dichotomy of theory and 
experiment that he criticised in Popper and in relativistic philosophies of science. Only 
from a theoretically specific point of view can we say that different scientists have 
performed or reproduced the same experiment, or that they have tried to measure the 
same quantity  with different  instruments.  This  solves  one of the  best-known open 
problems of Bridgman’s operationalism – one which mutatis mutandis has an obvious 
bearing  on  the  problem  of  the  identity,  or  identification,  of  an  experiment.  By 
changing  the  theoretical  framework  two  instances  of  one  ‘same’  experiment  can 
become  two  different  experiments.  Two  experiments,  identical  as  to  the 
experimenter’s  actions  and the  experimental  apparatus,  can  stand for  two distinct 
experiments, or even two experiments in distinct scientific disciplines, if performed to 
answer distinct theoretical questions. By ringing a bell before he fed fish in a pond, 
Otto von Guericke showed that sound travels through water; given that the hungry fish 
arrived at the ringing of the bell, this experiment in physics could pass perfectly as a 
psychological experiment in animal conditioning.5 
Since it would be impossible to identify a scientific experiment without theoretical 
mediation, it would be equally impossible, both in fact and in principle, to conceive its 
reproducibility without theoretical mediation. Galileo’s original experiment of a free 
falling body and the repetition of the same, performed by first year physics students 
using  sophisticated  devices  (such  as  photoelectric  cells,  electromagnets,  digital 
clocks), are, for all the various devices, the same experiment because each brings to  
3 See Kant, CPR: B xiii-xiv.
4 Hacking 1983: xiii.
5 For this example, cf. Sorensen (1992: 133), who uses it with a very different purpose, i.e. to show that 
no experiment is ‘completely public’. For another example, cf. Franklin 1989: 438-439. For another 
example, cf. Franklin 1989: 438-439. Before 1905, experiments on the composition of velocities were 
considered the ‘same’ whether the velocities they involved were far from or close to the velocity of 
light, since Newtonian mechanics does not distinguish on this basis. After that date, in the light of the 
special theory of relativity, these experiments take on entirely different meanings and therefore should 
be considered different experiments.
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light the same real causal connection that constitutes a specific answer to the same 
theoretical question. 
2. Unity and distinction of real and thought experiments
It makes intuitive sense to connect real and thought experiments in a way which might 
account  both  for  their  unity  and  their  distinction.  They  are  thought  of  as  united 
because  empirical thought experiments and real experiments tell us about the same 
reality,  and it would be difficult  to deny that they may either collaborate or clash. 
However, they are considered as distinct since it would be just as difficult to claim that 
their function is identical, either by declaring that real execution is superfluous or by 
reducing thought experiments to the formulation of questions that can be answered, 
even provisionally, exclusively by real experiments.
However, in order to give a non-contradictory account of the connection, made up of 
both unity and distinction, between experiments and thought experiments, we need to 
distinguish between an empirical or formal level of reasoning (empirical or formal in 
the  sense  of  empirical  or  logical-mathematical  disciplines)  and  a  reflexive-
transcendental point of view. 
Two  different  ways  of  understanding  the  relationship  between  the  two  types  of 
experiments  correspond  to  these  different  points  of  view.  In  this  way the  mutual 
autonomy and the complementarity of real and thought experiments may be grasped, 
avoiding the antinomy of making one of them an accessory of the other.
From  an  empirical  and/or  logical  point  of  view  of,  experiments  and  thought 
experiments are perfectly identical:
(1)  Thought  experiments  too  have  a  theoretical-dialogical  nature:  they  have  a 
determinate meaning only if they are (implicitly or explicitly) understood as answers 
to  theoretical  questions  put  to  nature  and  its  laws.  Thought  experiments,  even 
concretely  realised  ones,  would  remain  ambiguous  if  their  underlying  theoretical 
hypotheses were not specified. 
This aspect of thought experiments is particularly significant in the case of Galileo’s 
famous refutation of Aristotle’s theory of the free fall of bodies: 
“If then we take two bodies whose natural speeds are different, it is clear that on uniting the two, the 
more rapid one will be partly retarded by the slower, and the slower will be somewhat hastened by the 
swifter. […] But if this is true, and if a large stone moves with a speed of, say, eight while a smaller 
moves with a speed of four, then when they are united, the system will move with a speed less than 
eight; but the two stones when tied together make a stone larger than that which before moved with a 
speed of eight.  Hence  the heavier  body moves with less speed than the lighter;  an effect  which is 
contrary to your supposition.” (Galilei 1638: 65, Engl. transl. p. 63) 
With this  thought experiment,  Galileo asked what  was the precise  meaning of the 
experimental  question  put  to  nature  by  Aristotelian  physics  about  the  free  fall  of 
bodies: he showed that to formulate that question a distinction was needed, the lack of 
which made Aristotle’s answer ambiguous, and thus potentially contradictory. Strictly 
speaking, however, Galileo’s thought experiment does not show Aristotle’s theory to 
be necessarily contradictory. Rather, contradictions emerge only because of the lack of 
distinction  between  two  different  types  of  real  cases.  Galileo  does  not  show that 
Aristotle’s question, and consequently also his answer, are contradictory; what he does 
show  is  that  they  are  ambiguous  and  therefore  possibly contradictory.  Aristotle’s 
theory can be interpreted in two different ways leading to two mutually contradictory 
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hypotheses. In the first interpretation,  connected bodies behave, with respect to the 
system’s  natural  velocity,  like  separate  realities  affecting  one  another  so  that  ‘the 
system  will  move  with  a  speed  less  than  eight’  –  that  is,  at  a  velocity  which  is 
intermediate between the velocities at which each would have fallen had they been 
completely isolated from one another. In the second interpretation, connected bodies 
behave like one new reality, so that connected bodies will fall at a higher velocity than 
each in separation. Aristotle fails to specify a criterion on the basis of which to choose 
between  these  two  possibilities;  consequently,  he  is  unable  to  distinguish  the 
circumstances when freely falling bodies behave like mutually independent realities 
affecting one another, from the circumstances when they behave like a new, unique 
reality (we now know that this happens in some cases of fall within fluids). Since this 
contradiction arises  from the conflation  of two possible  types  of real  cases,  it  can 
easily be eliminated by introducing the relevant distinction and then choosing in which 
of the two possible senses we want to interpret physically the ‘sum’ of the weight of 
the bodies.6
(2) Thought experiments too have a  technical-operational  nature. On the one hand, 
both  experiments  and  thought  experiments  are  methodical  procedures  guided  by 
certain  hypotheses.  At  the  same  time,  however,  the  aim of  such  hypotheses  is  to 
understand,  by  applying  the  method  of  systematic  variation,  how  a  certain 
experimental  apparatus  varies  in  response  to  our  specific  interventions  on  it.  Put 
another way, the aim of experiments and thought experiments is to attain assertions 
about  the  functioning  of  an  experimental  apparatus  that  are  intersubjectively  and 
technically  testable.  Empirical  thought  experiments  too  can  determine  the  generic 
meaning  of  theoretical  questions,  through  use  of  experimental  apparatuses,  from 
simple  surfaces  and  spheres  to  very  complex  mechanisms;  these  very apparatuses 
make it possible to apply the method of systematic  variation.  This is why thought 
experiments (spanning from Galileo’s simple ones about falling bodies to the more 
complex  one  involving  Schrödinger’s  unhappy  cat7)  have  the  same  constitutive 
elements  as  real  experiments  –  namely,  a  theory  and  a  particular,  well  specified, 
experimental  apparatus.  We modify some aspects  of the apparatus intentionally,  in 
order to see the effects of these modifications in the light of (1) the hypothesis that has 
to be tested, and (2) assumptions, knowledge or skills accepted as obvious because 
6 Norton  1996 and  Gendler  1998 (taken  up  in  Gendler  2000),  believe,  for  different  reasons,  that 
Galileo’s  argument  is  on  the  whole  correct.  On  the  other  hand,  the  arguments  of  Stäudner  1998, 
Atkinson  2003,  Atkinson  and  Peijnenburg  2004  seem  to  converge,  albeit  indirectly,  with  my 
interpretation. Stäudner rightly notes that to remove a contradiction it is sufficient to abandon one of 
two mutually contradictory premises (cf. Stäudner 1998: 44). Atkinson and Peijnenburg just as rightly 
point out that it is impossible to prove that Aristotle’s theory is formally contradictory, since it is correct 
at least in one possible interpretation, namely in the case of bodies moving in a fluid, such as air or 
water: two twin sisters hanging from the same parachute fall twice as fast as only one sister hanging 
from that parachute (cf. Atkinson and Peijnenburg 2004: 118 and 128-129, who also explain this fact in 
terms  of  Newton’s  theory).  Kühne’s  2005  analysis  is  different,  since  it  questions  the  Aristotelian 
character  of the law of free fall that Galileo refutes; Kühne believes that Aristotle’s law is, strictly 
speaking,  analytic  and  does  not  make  quantitative  predictions  (see  Kühne  2005:  40-41).  The 
philological  reconstruction of Aristotle’s theory does not  fall  within the scope of this psper.  I  limit 
myself to noting that Kühne stresses the lack in Aristotle’s theory of the distinction between a weight at 
rest (weighed by means of a beam scale and responsible for our feeling of heaviness when carrying 
something heavy) and a weight in free fall (which we would not perceive if we were falling together 
with it, since we would be moving at the same speed) (cf. Kühne 2005: 49). On thought experiments in 
Galileo, cf. also Koyré  1939; Geymonat and Carugo1960; Drake 1973, 1974 and 1978; Settle 1961 and 
1975; Koertge 1977; Segre M. 1980; McMullin 1985; Naylor 1974, 1976 and 1989; Prudovsky 1989; 
Arthur 1999; Palmieri 2003 and 2005; Atkinson and Peijnenburg 2004; McAllister 2004, especially pp. 
1168-1171.
7 See Schrödinger 1935; on which see, e.g., Audretsch  1990.
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they are underpinned by independently confirmed empirical observations. In both real 
and thought experiments,  technically and operationally testable statements about an 
‘experimental machine’ are sought. 
(3) A third general feature of both real and thought experiments emerges from the first 
two common traits:  experiments and thought experiments must both obey the same 
technical-operational criterion, and they can both be evaluated only on the basis of  
that  criterion. Practical-technical  feasibility  is  thus  the  decisive  criterion,  even for 
empirical  thought  experiments.  A  thought  experiment  may  be  criticised  if  its 
experimental  realisation  is  believed  to  be  impossible,  either  because  it  contradicts 
scientific statements or laws about which there is reasonably certainty, or because it 
contains contradictions that make any realisation a priori impossible.
To be sure, there are a lot of thought experiments where the requirements of empirical 
realisability and technical-operational testability seem, at first sight, to be in principle 
unsatisfiable. A well-known example is the thought experiment where Galileo asked 
what would happen to the weight of a stone that was dropped into a tunnel that cut 
through  the  earth  and  went  beyond  its  centre.8 Another  well-known  exemple  is 
Einstein’s  lift  thought  experiment,  which  shows  that  there  is  no  reason to  accept 
certain empirical differences (in particular, between acceleration and gravity) in the 
absence of experimentally observable differences.9
The crucial point, however, is that no hypothesis suggested by an empirical thought 
experiment  can ever be absolutely unrealisable.  Empirical  thought experiments  are 
held to be scientifically useful and reliable because it is presupposed that, if they were 
realised, the sequence of events  that they describe according to causal connections,  
which we assume to  be operative in the real world,  would occur  in the way they 
anticipate,  and  would  lead  to  the  consequences  that  they  predict:  this  holds  in 
principle, no matter how remote the realisability of certain thought experiments may 
be. Of course, with the use of current technology we are unable to dig a hole through 
the centre of the earth; nonetheless, here too there is testability in principle. As for 
Einstein’s  lift  thought  experiment,  the  possibility  of  satellite  laboratories  rotating 
around the earth seems to suggest that it might one day be realised.10
(4) As in the case of real experiments, a thought experiment’s mental anticipation of 
nature’s  particular  answer  to  the  experimental  question  must  include  at  least  an 
inductive inference which exemplifies a nomic or law-like connection in a particular 
concrete  situation – that  is,  a  connection  which can be reproduced according  to  a 
certain rule, or, in other words, a law immanent to that situation.11
(5) As stated above, the meaning of the question put to nature is clarified in view of an 
experimental test which must be in principle reproducible, but this reproducibility can 
be  only  displayed  in  a  concrete  case.  The  importance  of  intuitive  appeal  and 
perspicuity  in  thought  experiments  depends  on  the  fact  that,  like  real,  thought 
experiments explore the links which, in concrete cases, connect theoretical hypotheses 
to empirical  reality.  In both real experiments and empirical  thought experiments,  a 
theoretical hypothesis is applied to a particular case or example in order to argue for or 
against that hypothesis. This is why visualisation is so important,  even in quantum 
physics.12
8 Cf. Galilei 1632, 162, Engl. transl. pp. 135-136.
9 Cf. Poser 1984: 185; Buschlinger 1993: 42 and 65-67; Schlesinger 1996: 478; Genz 1999: 101-104.
10 Cf. Sexl and Urbantke 1975: 22. It is hard to see why Buschlinger – who, as we have just noted, 
considers this experiment in principle unrealisable − cites this work: cf. Buschlinger 1993: 63.
11 Cf., for more details, especially Buzzoni 2008, ch. 2, §§ 2 and 6.
12 Cf., for more details, Buzzoni 2008, ch. 2, § 2.
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These resemblances are not accidental. In the positive (empirical and logical-formal) 
sense,  experiments  and  thought  experiments  must  be  identical.  They  coincide 
completely,  as do the hundred real dollars and the hundred merely thought ones in 
Kant.  My  conception  of  a  hundred  dollars  remains  the  same  whether  I  am  in 
possession of that sum or not:  thought experiments anticipate a connection between 
objects  which, when thought of as realised, makes the concepts of experiment and  
thought experiment coincide completely. In a positive sense, every (empirical) thought 
experiment corresponds to a real one that satisfies the same conceptual characteristics, 
and vice versa:  simply to imagine that the experimental apparatus, counterfactually  
anticipated in a thought experiment, has really been constructed is sufficient to erase  
any difference between thought and real experiments.
However,  despite  the  perfect  correspondence  on  a  positive  level  between  the 
intensions  of  the  terms  ‘experiment’  and  ‘thought  experiment’,  there  is  also  an 
obvious, if elusive, difference between them. While both types of experiments raise 
questions about nature and its laws, real experiments fix only the type, or genus, of the 
answer that  will  depend on a particular  functioning of the experimental  apparatus. 
Thought experiments, on the other hand, relying on previously accepted knowledge, 
also anticipate in thought what nature’s specific answer will be. A thought experiment  
is both the project in thought of a real experiment that is in principle realisable, and  
the  linguistic-discursive  anticipation  of  nature’s  specific  answer  to  the  question 
implicit in that real experiment.
As earlier stated: simply imagining that the experimental apparatus, counterfactually 
anticipated in a thought experiment, has really been constructed is sufficient to erase 
any  difference  between  thought  and  real  experiments.  This  very  ‘imagining’,  this 
capacity of the mind to assume every real entity as a possible entity,  underpins the 
difference in principle – a properly transcendental difference – between thought and 
real experiments. On a transcendental level, experiments and thought experiments are 
distinct  in  principle.  This  distinction  cannot  be  suppressed,  since  it  is  the  same 
distinction between the hypothetical-reflexive domain of the mind and reality (which 
can always only occur and develop in only one way).
If we neglect the transcendental distinction between our capacity to put questions to 
nature on the one hand, and the determinate empirical knowledge obtained by means 
of our body’s interaction with the surrounding empirical reality on the other, we end 
up  by  either  mixing  up  or,  on  the  contrary,  juxtaposing  the  mental  and  the  real 
dimensions of experiment. 
From a comprehensively naturalistic point of view, real and thought experiments do 
wholly coincide. If there were no other point of view from which to understand them, 
experiments and thought experiments would coincide completely.
It may, indeed, be objected that no one has ever reached such a conclusion. Certainly, 
no one can deny the difference between the mental and the real, between the idea, as 
such, of a chair and an individual, real chair: we all know that we can sit on the latter 
but not on the former. Oblivious of its transcendental basis, however, comprehensive 
naturalists treat this distinction as one between different, fixed logical entities – for 
example,  as  a  distinction  between  analytic  and  synthetic  judgements,  with  which 
thought experiments and real ones are respectively linked. In other words, naturalism 
can conceive of thinking and acting as complementary only as parts or entities that 
exist in the way in which sensible reality does. This is why naturalistic accounts of the 
distinction between real and thought experiments oscillates between the Scylla of the 
latter’s derivation by abstraction from the former, and the Charybdis of a supposed 
autonomy of thought experiments,  usually secured by assimilating them to logical-
formal procedures. If we neglect the transcendental distinction between our capacity to 
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put questions to nature on the one hand, and the determinate empirical  knowledge 
obtained by means of our body’s interaction with the surrounding empirical reality on 
the other, we end up by either mixing up or, on the contrary, juxtaposing the mental 
and the real dimensions of experiment. 
From a comprehensively naturalistic point of view, real and thought experiments do 
wholly coincide. If there were no other point of view from which to understand them, 
experiments and thought experiments would coincide completely.
Like the intensions of the concepts of a hundred imaginary and a hundred real dollars, 
experiments and thought experiments are, from different points of view, both identical 
and different. They are empirically identical, since thought experiments have the same 
distinctive characteristics as real ones –  apart from the fact that they anticipate an 
answer on the basis of knowledge or skills widely accepted or easily available within  
a certain scientific  community.  However,  just  herein lies the irreducible  difference 
between the two types of experiments: it is impossible to deny, without performative 
contradiction,  the mind’s  ability  to  detach itself  critically  from any reality,  and to 
picture it as a mere future possibility or (which is the same thing) as a mere future 
meaning.
This irriducibility of the transcendental-reflexive distinction between real and thought 
experiments, however, is the most profound root of their indissoluble connection from 
the  technical-operationalist  perspective  here  defended.  First  of  all,  consider  the 
connection between experiments and thought experiments on the transcendental level. 
In this case, we need to hold fast both to their mutual irreducibility, and to their in 
principle  necessary  connection.  They  are  irreducible  to  one  another  because  the 
activity of using hypotheses and anticipations (to which also the empirical use of our 
intellect is connected) is,  as such, irreducible to physical reality.  However, the two 
types of experiments are also connected, not because there is no distinction between 
them, but because the transcendental and the empirical aspects necessarily presuppose 
each other: a thought experiment would be devoid of  empirical meaning (that is, it 
would not be a thought experiment proper to empirical science) if, in formulating and 
evaluating it, in principle an at least implicit reference to a real experiment were not 
assumed. Kant’s example makes the point: thought dollars, like thought experiments, 
exist  only  in  the  sphere  of  the  possible,  while  real  dollars,  like  real  experiments, 
occupy  a  specific  place  among  the  interactions  between  our  bodies  and  the 
surrounding reality;  neither  the  thought  nor  the  real  entities,  however,  could  exist 
outside their mutual relationship.
The so-called ‘given’ of experience remains outside our cognitive horizon unless we 
put questions to nature – unless, that is, we subject the empirical data to the mediation 
of theory and hypothesis, and consider the possibility of the data being given or not. 
Each  new  word  learnt  by  a  child  is  an  empirical  example  of  this  transcendental 
connection between, on the one hand, the purely hypothetical character of the mind 
and, on the other hand, the individual hypotheses that the mind develops and tests on 
the  basis  of  experience.  A  child’s  utterance  of  the  word  ‘dog’  in  front  of  the 
appropriate  animal  is  the  answer  to  a  previous  question  about  a  certain  object  of 
experience, and presupposes the ability in general to problematise – that is, the ability 
to consider any datum as merely hypothetical. This is the only sense in which a child’s 
behaviour is irreducible to the performance of a machine which we can programme to 
say ‘dog’ whenever it encounters one.
The reflexive-transcendental unity and distinction of real and thought experiments also 
excludes any positive difference (any difference, that is, other than the transcendental 
one just referred to) between the intensions of the concepts in question. Experience 
‘accompanies’  (in  the  Kantian  sense  of  the  word)  thought  experiments  from  the 
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beginning to the end. This is the ultimate reason why all thought experiments must be  
thought of as translatable into real ones, and all real experiments as realisations of  
thought  ones.  Thought  experiments  are conceivable  as  preparing and anticipating  
real ones: they anticipate a connection between objects which, when thought of as 
realised,  makes  the  concepts  of  experiment  and  thought  experiment  coincide  
completely. What thought experiments have over and above real experiments is the 
mere (transcendental) fact that they exist in a purely hypothetical sphere; what real 
have over and above thought experiments is the mere (empirical-operational) fact that 
they overstep the sphere of the possible, in the experiment’s real execution.
3. Idealisation and counterfactuals in real and thought experiments.
The distinction between the transcendental-reflexive, and the empirical or formal level 
of  reasoning  is  also  necessary  to  correctly  evaluate  the  fact  that  the  premises  of 
thought experiments typically contain counterfactual assumptions. 
According to several authors, the presence of counterfactual assumptions, typical of 
thought  experiments,  raises  two  problems:  (1)  it  seems  to  constitute  the  main 
difference  between  thought  experiments  and  real  ones;  (2)  it  seems  to  exclude 
empirical testability.
Both  claims  are  to  be  rejected.  First,  real  experiments  too  are  unable  to  elude 
hypothetical or counterfactual assumptions. According to the dialectic of question and 
answer, it is impossible to conceive of a real experiment, or even to make the simplest 
observation, without assuming counterfactually a theoretical horizon that defines the 
meaning of a question put to nature. The simplest observation of the way reality is, 
presupposes  that  it  might  be  otherwise;  and  thus  presupposes  the  ultimate 
counterfactual assumption which provides the horizon of meaning of all understanding 
– namely, the transcendentally hypothetical character of the mind. Even a declarative 
sentence such as ‘the sun shines’ has a meaning only against the background of the 
possibility  that  the  sun  might  not  shine.  This  sentence  expresses  an  empirical 
observation which is the answer to a cognitive question, to a hypothesis about the state 
of the sun; without this hypothesis, which normally remains in the background and is 
not  made  explicit,  the  observation  that  the  sun shines  would  have  no  determinate 
meaning. I am able to perceive the redness of the rose that I am looking at right now, 
only because I can assume hypothetically the possibility that it  might be any other 
colour, and then reject that possibility on the basis of my empirical perceptions, i.e., on 
the basis of the interaction between my eyes and that determinate aspect of the real 
thing which is its colour.
Second, counterfactual assumptions do not rule out the empirical testability of thought 
experiments. It was Weber who first clearly saw the intimate association between the 
foundation of our knowledge and counterfactual assumptions. Weber famously defied 
the traditional mistrust of ‘what if’ questions in history when he argued that, in order 
to  understand the causal-probabilistic  importance of an event  such as the battle  of 
Marathon for the development of Greek culture and Western civilisation, a historian 
must  start  by  asking  (explicitly  or  implicitly)  what  would  have  happened  if  the 
Persians had won rather than the Greeks. The historian must answer this question by 
abstracting from what really happened and constructing an ideal, or possible, course 
of events.
The decisive point of Weber’s analysis of the famous Marathon battle example is the 
fact  that  the understanding of causal connections is not hindered, but indeed made 
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possible, by the use of counterfactual conditionals. As Weber aptly puts it, ‘[i]n order 
to penetrate to the real causal interrelationships, we construct unreal ones.’13
Weber,  however, defended the ‘objectivity’  of causal imputation by appealing to a 
nomological knowledge that we already possess, but gave no clear answer as to the 
basis for the legitimacy of this type of knowledge. How can we give empirical content 
to ideal entities that are the product of counterfactual assumptions? This difficulty can 
be expressed with relation to the model of experimental  investigation based on the 
dialectic of question and answer: how can real experiments specify and determine the 
generic concept that forms the theoretical horizon of the experimental question, when 
they contain idealisations and counterfactual assumptions which, by definition, make 
use  of  unreal  entities  such  as  we  could  never  encounter  in  real  experience  (like 
perfectly  flat  frictionless  surfaces,  inextensible  pendulums  etc.)?  The  presence  of 
counterfactual assumptions in thought experiments prevents neither their realisation 
nor  the  possibility  of  obtaining  concrete  empirical  information  from  them  which 
extends our mastery of reality.  On the contrary,  counterfactual assumptions are the 
condition that makes it possible in principle for thought experiments to become real 
ones; they are the condition of the possibility of the production of increasingly good 
technical-practical realisations of thought experiments.
Counterfactual  idealisations  form the theoretical  background against  which we are 
able  to  detect  empirical  imperfections  and  deviations  from  the  ideal  type;  the 
knowledge  attained  in  this  way  makes  it  possible  to  translate  the  ideal  model, 
technically  and  operationally,  into  technical  and  experimental  apparatuses  that 
increasingly approximate the ideal type.  This binds thought experiments closely to 
real ones, since in both cases good idealisations, unlike bad ones, allow predictions 
that fit with what we can ascertain experimentally, and realise technically.
Idealisations that omit certain variables – and so lead to statements that are empirically 
‘false’ from certain points of view – can have empirical  meaning,  if the technical-
experimental, reproducible conditions under which specific omissions take place are 
clearly spelt out. Once this is done, it becomes clear that, from the epistemological 
point  of  view (that  is,  regardless  of  the  personal  abilities  of  those  who apply the 
theory), idealisation, far from jeopardising the connection between truth and technical 
applicability,  reaffirms it. The legitimacy of counterfactual idealisations depends on 
the possibility in principle, or on the actual existence, of an experimental apparatus 
that realises the same result of the thought experiment with a degree of approximation 
sufficient to attain certain goals. 
It is irrelevant whether Galileo’s refutation of Aristotle’s theory of free fall was a mere 
thought  experiment,  or  whether  it  was  actually  performed.  In  either  case,  Galileo 
ignored certain variables, such as the lack of friction with the medium, and all those 
qualities that, in Galileo’s terminology, reside in the ‘sensitive body’, such as colour, 
smell, taste etc.  This serves the purpose both of circumscribing and simplifying the 
object  of  investigation  (which  as  a  result  becomes  somewhat  idealised),  and,  
especially, of making experiments in principle reproducible in a technical, and not  
only mental, sense.
The counterfactual assumption of a perfectly smooth, frictionless surface constitutes a 
sort  of zero coordinate;  and with respect to this  the fact  that  a metal  block,  when 
subjected  to  an impulse  force,  will  stop after  a  certain  distance,  requires  a  causal 
explanation. Even though the surface is perfectly smooth according to the instruments 
at our disposal, it is perhaps not absolutely smooth: consequently, friction may be at 
least  one of the causes of the end of the motion.  The fact  that,  in the absence of 
friction,  a  body would continue  to  travel  for  ever  is  a  thought  experiment  which, 
13 Weber 1906: 287, Engl. transl. pp 185-186.
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because it is counterfactually assumed, makes friction a possible real cause: perhaps if 
we reduced friction, the body might cover a proportionally greater distance, and if we 
increased friction, the body might slow down and, above a certain value, even come to 
a halt.
We must  now test  these hypotheses.  First,  we must devise technical  procedures to 
make the surface smoother; then, if we find out that the same body, to which the same 
impulse force is applied, covers a greater distance on a smoother surface, we will have 
reason to believe that we have discovered at least one of the causes of the phenomenon 
–  that  is,  one  of  the  conditions  that  make  the  phenomenon  reproducible  and 
controllable. In other words, one of the reasons for the claim that friction ‘causes’ a 
moving body to stop is that we can reduce friction,  concretely making surfaces that 
increasingly  approximate  the  ideal  type  of  a  frictionless  surface,  and  note  the 
corresponding reduction of the effect of friction. 
When in a thought experiment it is claimed that a surface is perfectly smooth or that 
the arms  of  a  balance  are  perfectly  symmetrical,  there  is  imagined an ideal  entity 
which provides a  rule,  a norm or  a  criterion.  Without  this  criterion,  we would be 
unable even to conceive of the imperfections and empirical deviations that characterise 
real  occurrences  and  situations;  we  would  be  unable  to  measure  those  empirical 
deviations,  and  to  search  for  their  causes;  finally,  we would  be  unable  to  realise 
technically increasingly smooth surfaces and increasingly symmetrical balance arms. 
In short, we would be unable to satisfy the technical-operational criterion, which is the 
distinctive feature of empirical sciences.
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